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PREMATURE SERVICE OF PAYMENT CLAIMS UNDER THE BUILDING AND 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY SECURITY OF PAYMENT ACT 
 
Audi Construction Pte Ltd v Kian Hiap Construction Pte Ltd1 
 
BENJAMIN JOSHUA ONG* 
 
In Audi Construction Pte Ltd v Kian Hiap Construction Pte Ltd, the Singapore Court of Appeal considered a 
payment claim to have been validly served although it was served earlier than the contractually stipulated 
date. This was because the service of the payment claim was “effective” only from the contractually stipulated 
date, and the claimant had had a “good reason” to serve the payment claim early. This note critically examines 
the reasoning in Audi vis-à-vis the existing law, the principle of freedom of contract, and the intentions of the 
parties in that case. In the absence of future judicial elaboration on the “effective service” and “good reason” 
doctrines, there is a risk that, in future, respondents may draw on these doctrines to delay or frustrate the 
attempts of claimants to recover payments rightly due to them. Moreover, given that the Court had found that 
the doctrine of estoppel would have operated in favour of the Claimant anyway, the creation of the “effective 
service” and “good reason” principles was not necessary. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two important policy considerations behind the Building and Construction Industry 
Security of Payment Act.2 First, the SOP Act was intended to create a “fast and low cost 
adjudication system to resolve payment disputes”.3 Second, according to the Court of Appeal, 
“certainty is vital in the context of an abbreviated process of dispute resolution such as that set 
out in the Act”.4 This includes certainty as to time limits for serving the payment claim and 
payment response: 
 
The time limits are a critical aspect of the scheme’s purpose to ensure prompt resolution of 
disputes about payment. It is commercially important that each party knows precisely where 
they stand at any point of time. Such certainty is of considerable commercial value.5 
 
These two policies can come into tension.  For example, the ideal of certainty could be used to 
justify the existence of exacting technical requirements imposed on claimants. If the claimant 
does not comply with such requirements to the letter, its claim, even if wholly meritorious, will 
fail, hence creating delays and increasing costs. 
This tension lay at the heart of the case of Audi Construction Pte Ltd v Kian Hiap Construction 
Pte Ltd.6 This case concerned section 10(2)(a) of the SOP Act, which provides: “A payment 
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claim shall be served – at such time as specified in or determined in accordance with the terms 
of the contract”. Kian Hiap Construction Pte Ltd (“the Respondent”) had engaged Audi 
Construction Pte Ltd (“the Claimant”) as a sub-contractor. According to the contract between 
the parties, the Claimant was “entitled to serve a payment claim as defined in Section 10 of the 
Act on the date for submission of progress claims as set out in Appendix 1.”7 Appendix 1 stated 
that the date “for submitting progress claims” was the “20th day of each calendar month”.8 On 
18 November 2016, the Claimant served on the Respondent a payment claim dated 20 
November 2016.9 Its reason for not serving the payment claim on the 20th was that the 20th 
was a Sunday and the Respondent’s office was closed.10 
The Respondent did not serve a payment response on the Claimant. Therefore, the 
Respondent was not allowed to raise before the Adjudicator “any reason for withholding any 
amount”,11 and was instead constrained to argue that the Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to 
begin with. Accordingly, when the matter went to adjudication, the Respondent disputed that 
the payment claim was valid, on the grounds that it had not been served on the 20th.12 The 
Adjudicator rendered an adjudication determination in favour of the Claimant;13 he agreed with 
the Claimant that, on a “purposive approach” to contractual interpretation, the contract required 
the Claimant to “serve a payment claim by the 20th day of each calendar month and if the 20th 
was a Sunday or public holiday, on the last working day immediately preceding the 20th”14. 
 
A. The High Court’s Decision 
 
Because the Respondent had not paid the adjudicated amount to the Claimant,15 it was not 
entitled to apply for review of the adjudication determination.16 Therefore, all the Respondent 
could do, short of making payment to the Claimant, was to apply to the High Court to set the 
adjudication determination aside on grounds, inter alia, that the payment claim had not been 
served on the contractually stipulated date, which was the 20th.17 The Claimant retorted that 
the contract, properly interpreted, meant that the payment claim was to be served by the 20th.18 
The Claimant also argued that, in any event, the Respondent had waived its right to object to 
the premature service of the payment claim. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Audi (HC), supra note 1 at para 5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Audi (CA), supra note 1 at para 3. 
10 Ibid at para 7. 
11 SOP Act, supra note 2, s 15(3). 
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No 136 of 2017, vol 1, at p 46ff (located in the Case File). For completeness, it may be noted that the 
Respondent had also sought to argue that part of the payment claim had been “made fraudulently”; but the 
Adjudicator rejected this contention, adding that this objection “could have been set out in a payment response” 
instead: Adjudication Determination at paras 74, 80. 
15 This is evident from the fact that the Respondent’s application in Audi (HC), supra note 1, was made in 
response to the Claimant’s application to enforce the adjudication determination: Audi (CA), supra note 1 at  
para 8. 
16 SOP Act, supra note 2, s 18(3). 
17 Audi (HC), supra note 1 at para 3(a). 
18 Ibid at para 6. 
  
The High Court set aside the adjudication determination. It reasoned that “the words [of the 
contract] are clear enough”:19 “the terms of the Contract provide that service of the [payment 
claim] must be done on the 20th day of the month, neither sooner nor later.”20 Because the 
payment claim had been served prematurely, it had not been a valid payment claim.21 While it 
was unclear whether as a matter of law the Respondent could waive its objection (or could be 
estopped from making it),22 the High Court found that no waiver or estoppel could have been 
made out on the facts.23 
For completeness, it should be noted that the Respondent also sought to argue that the 
payment claim was invalid because it did not, on its face, state explicitly that it was a claim 
made under the SOP Act.24 However, the High Court held that this was of no relevance.25 
 
B. The Court of Appeal’s Decision 
 
The Claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeal and restored the 
outcome of the Adjudicator’s determination. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s interpretation of the contract: “where the 
parties’ contract provides for the service of payment claims on a stipulated date, this means 
service on that date and not service by that date.”26 The Court of Appeal added that this result 
was justified by the requirement of “certainty” in a “regime which… places great importance 
on timeliness.”27 However, it found that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel were available as 
a matter of law;28 and that, on the facts, the Respondent was “estopped from raising an objection 
to the payment claim’s invalid service” because the Respondent did not serve a payment 
response on the Claimant setting out its objections.29 
This note will accept that all this was correct. This would have sufficed to dispose of the 
appeal in favour of the Claimant. However, this was not the main reason why the Court of 
Appeal allowed the Claimant’s appeal. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that, in the first place, 
the payment claim had been validly served.30 This was because: 
 
First, the [Claimant] had a good reason for effecting service of the payment claim before 20 
November 2016. That day was a Sunday, and there was no dispute that the [R]espondent’s 
office was closed on Sundays. Second, there could not have been any confusion as to the 
payment claim’s operative date. The payment claim was correctly dated 20 November 2016, 
the day on which the contract entitled the [Claimant] to serve a payment claim. In our 
judgment, it was clear and obvious to the [R]espondent from this manner of dating that the 
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21 Ibid  at para 50. 
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26 Audi (CA), supra note 1 at para 23. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid at para 62. 
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[Claimant] intended for the payment claim to be treated as being served and, importantly, 
operative only on 20 November 2016.31 
 
This note critically considers the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in the passage just cited, in which 
the Court of Appeal has introduced two new ideas: 
 
(a) the idea that a payment claim has an “operative date” which may be different from the 
date on which the payment claim is served; and 
 
(b) the idea that there can be a “good reason for effecting service of the payment claim” at 
a time other than that stipulated in the contract. 
 
 
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “EFFECTIVE” OR “OPERATIVE” SERVICE ON THE ONE 
HAND, AND SERVICE ON THE OTHER 
 
The Court of Appeal’s reasoning rests on the assumption that a payment claim has such a thing 
as an “operative date”, before which the payment claim, though “physically served”,32 does not 
“take effect”.33 It is not clear how this distinction between effective or operative service on the 
one hand and service simpliciter on the other may be squared with the existing law or with the 
intentions of the parties in Audi. Moreover, there is a risk that it could create practical 
difficulties. 
 
A. The Distinction  Vis-à-vis the Act 
 
First, the aforementioned distinction is not located in the SOP Act. The SOP Act makes no 
reference to such concepts as “effective” service or an “operative date”. Indeed, the SOP Act 
(and the associated Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Regulations)34 
does not even require the payment claim to bear any date at all. By contrast, other documents, 
such as the adjudication application, are explicitly required to be dated,35 which suggests a clear 
intention by the framers of the SOP Regulations (made pursuant to the SOP Act) that no 
significance be attached to the date which the payment claim bears. Instead, the only relevant 
date relating to payment claims mentioned in the SOP Act is the date of service: for example, 
as the High Court pointed out,36 section 11 of the SOP Act defines the deadline for service of 
the payment response by reference to a number of “days after the payment claim is served 
under section 10”.37 
Where, then, did the doctrine of “effective” or “operative” service come from, if not the SOP 
Act? Though the Court of Appeal in Audi (CA) did not cite any authorities for it, an examination 
                                                                                                                                                                     
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid  at para 27. 
34 Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Regulations 2005 (S 2/2005, 2006 Rev Ed Sing) [SOP 
Regulations], made pursuant to the SOP Act, supra note 2, s 41. 
35 Ibid, r 7(1)(c)(iii). 
36 Audi (HC), supra note 1 at para 11 read with para 9. 
37 SOP Act, supra note 2, ss 11(1)(a), 11(1)(b). 
  
of the submissions38 shows that the Claimant had cited, by way of analogy, part of the following 
passage from the previous Court of Appeal case of Lee Wee Lick Terence v Chua Say Eng: 
 
… [W]e do not agree… that a payment claim which satisfies all the statutory requirements is 
not a payment claim if it is expressly stated not to be a payment claim, and that it would be 
absurd for the court to accept it as a payment claim… In our view, the claimant in such a case 
is merely saying that the payment claim is not operative as a payment claim. It is no different 
from saying to the respondent: ‘You do not need to pay this claim until I give you further 
notice’. Another example would be the claimant saying to the respondent that: ‘You need 
only pay this claim by [a stated date]’, and that date has not passed. A claimant who has made 
such a representation is estopped from asserting in court that his payment claim is operative 
as a payment claim until the referenced event occurs.39 
 
It is not clear whether the Court of Appeal in Audi (CA) had been influenced by the italicised 
words in the preceding passage. It is submitted that those words do not support the conclusion 
in Audi (CA). The Court of Appeal in Chua Say Eng did not state that there exists a distinct 
legal concept of “operative service” such that a payment claim can be served on one date (A) 
but be “operative” with effect only from a later date (B). It merely stated that the claimant can 
be estopped from relying on the claim prior to date B; if the claimant were to rely on the claim 
prior to date B, the respondent would be able to raise this estoppel as a defence.  But it cannot 
be that this estoppel—which is brought about by the claimant’s unilateral act of post-dating 
the payment claim—has an impact on the respondent’s position so as to oblige the respondent 
to treat the payment claim as having been served on date B. To hold otherwise, as is the effect 
of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Audi (CA), is not only to turn estoppel from a ‘shield’ into 
a ‘sword’, but to place this ‘sword’ into the hands of the claimant rather than the respondent. 
Moreover, such an argument would neglect another key passage from Chua Say Eng, which 
alludes to the law’s placing significance of the fact of service, regardless of what the claimant 
intends or what the respondent understands by such service. According to Chua Say Eng, the 
scheme of the SOP Act is such that: 
 
… [T]he legislated formal requirements for payment claims are designed to ensure that 
specified items of information are made available to the respondent before the claimant’s 
rights under the Act are engaged. The emphasis is therefore not on the claimant’s intention 
but on the respondent being given notice of certain information about the claim (such as the 
amount claimed, the contract under which the claim is made and a breakdown of the items 
constituting the claim). As for the mode of giving notice, Parliament has stopped short of 
requiring the information to be personally communicated to the respondent. This can be seen 
from the service requirements in s 37(1) of the Act: that provision states that documents ‘may 
be served’ by personal delivery (s 37(1)(a)), by leaving the document at the respondent’s 
usual or last known place of business (s 37(1)(b)), or by posting or faxing it to that place (s 
37(1)(c)). Other modes of service may also be possible. There is no requirement that the 
respondent actually needs to understand or even read the payment claim for the service 
requirement to be met…40 
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In other words, the point of the SOP Act is that, as the High Court in Audi (HC) put it, “the 
entire process is initiated by the service of a payment claim.”41 It should therefore be possible 
to tell whether the process has begun without asking what, if anything, the respondent has 
understood by that which had been served. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Audi (CA) has is 
not in line with this principle. 
 
B. The Distinction  Vis-à-vis the Parties’ Intentions 
 
When they entered into the contract, the parties in Audi did not contemplate any distinction 
between “effective”/“operative” service and service. There was simply no mention of such 
concepts anywhere in the contractual documents.42 In fact, the contract clearly stated: “The 
Contractor [i.e. the Respondent] shall be entitled to serve a payment response as defined in 
Section 11 of the Act within 21 days of service of the payment claim by the Sub-Contractor 
[i.e. the Claimant]”.43 In other words, the parties had evidently chosen to attach significance 
only to the date of service, and not to the date of “effective” or “operative” service.  
The Court of Appeal also remarked that effecting service on the 18th was a “practical and 
sensible way of complying with the parties’ contract.”44 There are two problems with this. First, 
it is difficult to see how the Court of Appeal could have considered doing so to have been an 
act of “complying with the parties’ contract”, given that the Court of Appeal had explicitly 
made a finding that the proper interpretation of the “parties’ contract” was that: “where the 
parties’ contract provides for the service of payment claims on a stipulated date, this means 
service on that date and not service by that date”.45 
Second, and more fundamentally, the question is not whether the service of the payment claim 
was in accordance with the contract, but rather whether it was in accordance with the SOP Act. 
This was a point which the Court of Appeal itself made (albeit in a different context): 
 
… [W]hat is ultimately being given effect to here is the statutory obligation under s 10(2)(a). 
It is that obligation which the [R]espondent claimed the [Claimant] had breached. The 
modality of that obligation is no doubt the parties’ contract, but that does not make it any less 
a statutory obligation in substance.46 
 
The requirement as to the timing of service of a payment claim arises from section 10(2) of the 
SOP Act. The relevant parts of section 10(2) read: “A payment claim shall be served—(a) at 
such time as specified in or determined in accordance with the terms of the contract”. 
According to the Court of Appeal, the terms of the contract state that service is to take effect 
on the 20th. It must therefore follow that the Court of Appeal’s new doctrine of “effective 
service” purports to be a doctrine that takes effect not in accordance with, but rather despite, 
the terms of the contract. One may therefore question the relevance of whether service which 
has taken place is “effective” or “operative” , given that section 10(2) states that the permissible 
time at which a payment claim may be served is to be determined only according to the “terms 
of the contract” and nothing more. Perhaps it would have been preferable for the Court of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
41 Audi (HC), supra note 1 at para 11. 
42 The documents constituting the contract appear in the Agreed Bundle of Documents, vol 1, at 76ff (located in 
the Case File). 
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44 Audi (CA), supra note 1 at para 28. 
45 Ibid at para 23 [emphasis in original]. 
46 Ibid at para 36. 
  
Appeal to have based its decision on the notion that, on the proper interpretation of the contract, 
“on” meant “on or by”; or that the concept of “effective service” had been implied in the 
contract. This would have reached the same result, but in a manner more clearly coherent with 
section 10(2) of the SOP Act. 
 
C. The Distinction May Create Practical Problems 
 
The law and the parties’ intentions aside, there is a good practical reason for the law to focus 
on the fact of service, without reference to whether or not such service is “effective” or 
“operative”. Focusing on the fact of service creates a bright line: it is perfectly easy to tell when 
service has taken place, for that is a simple question of fact. Legal practitioners are familiar 
with simple techniques used to prove this fact, such as keeping fax transmission receipts and 
email transmission receipts; requesting that the recipient of physically delivered documents 
sign a form to acknowledge receipt; and taking time-stamped photographs to prove that 
documents have been left at a particular location. By contrast, the decision in Audi (CA) may 
risk blurring this bright line by permitting parties to formulate (indefinitely complex) rules as 
to when service has taken place but is said not to be “effective”, which could then raise a 
potentially complex question of interpretation of these rules. 
It is worth noting the implications of the above for the adjudication process. Consider the 
situation in which the adjudicator has to deal with a preliminary challenge to his/her jurisdiction 
on the ground that the payment claim has not been validly served.47 If the validity of service 
turns only on the fact of service, such a preliminary challenge may be disposed of relatively 
swiftly, in line with the SOP Act’s aims of providing a quick dispute resolution system—the 
adjudicator only needs to determine whether and when service has taken place. This was 
perfectly straightforward in Audi: the Respondent had stamped a copy of the payment claim 
with the words “RECEIVED 18 NOV 2016” and provided a signature to acknowledge receipt;48 
and neither the Adjudicator, nor the High Court, nor the Court of Appeal had ever been in doubt 
that service had taken place on the 18th.49 By contrast, according to the Court of Appeal in Audi 
(CA), the validity of service turns on whether the service is “effective” or “operative”, which 
in turn depends on the content of the payment claim. Following this latter approach, the 
preliminary challenge would require the adjudicator to enter into a potentially extensive inquiry 
as to the parties’ intentions. This would not only increase costs, but also invite even more 
disputes over the interpretation of the contract and of the payment claim in the course of 
applications to court to enforce or set aside the adjudication determination. 
 
III. THE “GOOD REASON” TEST 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision that the date of “effective” or “operative” service may be 
different from the date of service, taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that a payment 
claim could be served weeks or even months in advance so long as the date written on it is the 
date on which, according to the contract, service is to take place. However, the Court of Appeal 
attempted to remove this possibility by stating that early service of the payment claim would 
only be valid if the claimant had a “good reason for serving [the] payment claim early”.50 
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Therefore, said the Court, “[o]ur decision in this appeal therefore does not entail that a payment 
claim may be served as early as a claimant wishes so long as he dates it correctly.”51 This 
reasoning raises several issues. 
First, there is simply no such principle in contract law as a warrant to one party to depart from 
the clear terms of a contract for a “good reason”. It is for the parties, in the exercise of their 
freedom of contract, to define for themselves, through express contractual stipulation, what 
they consider to be a good reason to allow or not allow something to be done in a particular 
way. It is generally not for the courts to formulate a notion of what they consider objectively 
to be a “good reason” and to impute this notion to the parties. Therefore, if the Court of Appeal 
had a reason, specific to construction law, to do so, it would have been much clearer had this 
been articulated explicitly. 
Second, given the terms of the contract, it is not at all clear why the existence of a “good 
reason” should have mattered. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Respondent that “the 
payment claim could have been served on 20 November 2016 by fax, by e-mail, or by leaving 
it at the respondent’s registered office or usual place of business.”52 However, it elliptically 
stated that this did not “undermin[e] the good reason which the [Claimant] had for physically 
serving the payment claim early on 18 November 2016.”53 This is potentially confusing because 
the Court of Appeal had earlier held that, according to the terms of the contract, the payment 
claim was to be served on the 20th.54 If it had been perfectly possible for the Claimant to do 
what the contract said was to be done, how can it be said that the Claimant had had a “good 
reason” for failing to do so? 
Third, the Court of Appeal’s judgment does not squarely address the question of what a “good 
reason” might be. The only “good reason” identified by the Court of Appeal was the fact that 
the 20th “was a Sunday, and there was no dispute that the [R]espondent’s office was closed on 
Sundays.”55 However, the relevance of this fact is unclear. If the principle is that the claimant 
ought to serve the payment claim on the Respondent on a day on which the Respondent’s office 
was open, then one would think that there would only have been a “good reason” to serve the 
payment claim on Saturday the 19th (on which the Respondent’s office was open).56 Surely 
service on the 19th would come closer to what the contract stipulated (viz service on the 20th), 
compared to service on the 18th. Yet the Court of Appeal held that there was a “good reason” 
to effect service on the 18th. If that was so, one might ask: would there not have been a “good 
reason” to effect service on the 17th or even earlier? Yet the Court of Appeal said: 
 
[I]f the payment claim in this case had been served on 10 November 2016 and dated 20 
November 2016, this would not have constituted valid service because, short of evidence to 
the contrary, there would have been no good reason for serving it this far in advance.57 
 
It is not clear exactly how “far in advance” would be considered acceptable. 
One might also think that an example of a “good reason” for early service would be a desire 
to ease business relations between the parties, for example by making it easier for the 
respondent to process the payment claim. However, the Court of Appeal held that, even if the 
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52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid at para 23. 
55 Ibid at para 26. 
56 Ibid at para 29. 
57 Ibid. 
  
“earlier physical service of the payment claim gave the respondent more time to deal with the 
payment claim”,58 this “shed no light on whether there was compliance with [the contract]”59. 
One may ask: why should a desire to help the other party not constitute a “good reason”? It 
would appear that the only acceptable “good reason” for the applicant to effect early service is 
a self-interested one. 
Finally, as the Court of Appeal rightly pointed out, the payment claim could simply have been 
served on Monday the 21st because of section 50(c) of the Interpretation Act, which provides 
that: 
 
[W]hen any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken on a certain day, 
then, if that day happens to be [a Sunday or a public holiday], the act or proceeding shall be 
considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards, not 
being an excluded day.60 
 
This being so, it is not clear why the Court of Appeal considered that there had been a “good 
reason” to depart from a contractual obligation that was not only possible to perform according 
to its terms, but for which a statute had provided a permissible alternative. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeal’s decision risks stultifying the legislative intention as to the timing of performance of 
obligations which would otherwise have to be performed on Sundays. 
To this last point, the Court of Appeal also added: 
 
If parties in future adopt the solution in s 50(c) [of the Interpretation Act], there should be no 
need for them to be unnecessarily ‘creative’ in their attempts to comply with the contractually-
specified date, as the [Claimant] appears to have been in this case through early service of a 
post-dated payment claim.61 
 
With respect, the decision in Audi may be seen as having allowed the parties to engage in such 
unnecessary “creativ[ity]”. As the Court of Appeal itself had acknowledged, it had been 
perfectly possible for the Claimant to “comply with the contractually-specified date” without 
any sort of creativity at all by effecting service “by fax, by e-mail, or by leaving it at the 
respondent’s registered office or usual place of business.”62 Moreover, if the need for certainty 
in upholding the clear terms of the contract were not a sufficient reason for the Court of Appeal 
to refrain from giving its blessing to service of the payment claim on a day other than what the 
contract provided for, surely the need to uphold the clear meaning of the SOP Act read with 
section 50(c) of the Interpretation Act is. 
Perhaps matters would have been different if it had been impossible or virtually impossible 
to comply with the timeline stipulated in the contract, such as, hypothetically, if the contract 
were to state that the payment claim was to be served during a particular hour: in that case, the 
Court of Appeal’s decision would be easier to understand.63 However, these were simply not 
                                                                                                                                                                     
58 Ibid at para 32. In truth, early service would not have given the respondent more time because the time limit 
for serving the payment response started to run from the date of service of the PC. This was stipulated in the 
SOP Act, supra note 2, s 11(1) (as explained in Audi (HC), supra note 1 at paras 10, 11), and also expressly 
provided for in the contract (Clause 61 of the “Conditions of Sub-Contract No: KHC/AMKNH/C-42/15” dated 
2 October 2015, appearing in the Agreed Bundle of Documents, vol 1, at 88) (located in the Case File). 
59 Audi (CA), supra note 1 at para 32 [emphasis omitted]. 
60 Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed Sing) [Interpretation Act], cited in Audi (CA), supra note 1 at paras 
34-36. 
61 Audi (CA), supra note 1 at para 35. 
62 Ibid at para 29. 
63 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
  
the facts in issue in Audi. Even if the Court of Appeal had intended to scuttle such attempts at 
the use of unduly onerous contractual provisions to make it difficult for claimants to claim 
payment, one may question whether this was a good justification for applying the “good 
reason” doctrine to the facts in Audi, where it was both possible to effect service as required 
by the contract and legally permissible to effect service a day after that. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The Court of Appeal’s conclusion is practically sensible, but its reasoning could have been 
expressed a lot more clearly. The Court said: “where the parties’ contract provides for the 
service of payment claims on a stipulated date, this means service on that date and not service 
by that date.”64 The contract so provided.65 Contrary to this provision, the payment claim was 
served on a day other than on the 20th. Yet the Court of Appeal ended up concluding that “there 
was compliance with [the terms of] the contract and therefore compliance with section 10(2)(a) 
of the Act.”66 With respect, it must be incorrect to say that non-compliance with clearly worded 
contractual terms can turn into compliance because there is a “good reason”67 for the non-
compliance, or because even though a document is served on one day, “it was clear and obvious 
to the [R]espondent from [the] manner of dating that the [Claimant] intended for the payment 
claim to be treated as being served and, importantly, operative”68 on another day. 
The Court of Appeal’s approach might be better justified had the Court explicitly attributed 
it to the parties’ intentions by holding that the proper interpretation of the contract was that 
service could be effected a few days before the 20th, or that there was an implied term to this 
effect. However, the High Court rejected the former view,69 and the Court of Appeal rejected 
the latter;70 in other words, both courts held that the parties did not intend such a result. Yet the 
Court of Appeal went on to impose the very same result on the parties by creating new doctrines 
whose basis, and whose relation to the parties’ intentions, were not clear. After all, it had not 
been impossible or unduly onerous to comply with the terms of the contract: to the contrary, it 
had been possible to serve the payment claim on the 20th,71 as the contract required. Therefore, 
in the absence of further judicial elaboration on the principles on Audi, there is a risk that 
disputants in future may draw on those principles in a manner that detracts from the policy 
objective of certainty and undermines the terms of the contract. Indeed, given that the Court 
had found that the doctrine of estoppel would have operated in favour of the Claimant anyway, 
the creation of the “effective service” and “good reason” principles was not necessary. 
Had the Court of Appeal not created the doctrines of “effective service” and “good reason”, 
the case would have been straightforward, and there would have been but three simple and 
sensible lessons to draw from it: 
 
(a) When parties stipulate deadlines in their contracts, clear and unambiguous allowance 
should be made for weekends and public holidays. 
(b) Parties should be aware of the provisions in relevant legislation, such as section 50(c) of 
the Interpretation Act, which affect the calculation of days and deadlines. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
64 Audi (CA), supra note 1 at para 23. 
65 Ibidat para 22. 
66 Ibidat para 40. 
67 Ibid at para 26. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Audi (HC), supra note 1 at para 11. 
70 Audi (CA), supra note 1 at paras 38, 39. 
71 Audi (HC), supra note 1 at para 12; ibid at para 29. 
  
(c) If a would-be respondent receives what purports to be a payment claim and disagrees 
that the payment claim is valid or has been validly served, that would-be respondent 
should immediately write to the purported claimant to place on record its objections, in 
order to avoid being estopped from raising those objections later on. 
 
These practical tips will no doubt create greater commercial certainty for parties in future. 
However, the new doctrines of “effective service” and “good reason” risk creating 
countervailing uncertainty. It is hoped that these concepts will not prove to be technicalities 
which parties will draw on, contrary to the wording and spirit of the SOP Act, to delay or 
frustrate the attempts of claimants under the SOP Act to recover payments rightly due to them.72 
It may be that this particular problem may eventually go away due to legislative reform. In 
June 2018, the Ministry of National Development and the Building and Construction Authority 
conducted a public consultation exercise on, inter alia, a proposal that the SOP Act be amended 
to: 
 
[A]llow claimant[s] to serve their payment claims on or before the specified day or fixed 
period under the contract, but these payment claims will be deemed to have been served only 
on the contractual date or last day of the period.73 
 
If eventually implemented, this would deal with the problem which gave rise to the dispute in 
Audi in the first place. 
Even then, though, a broader problem raised by the Court of Appeal’s decision will remain: 
to what extent do the policy considerations behind the SOP Act justify departure from the 
parties’ intentions, and might similar policy considerations even apply in other statutory or 
even non-statutory contexts? It is hoped that the Court of Appeal will provide more clear 
guidance on this point in future. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
72 The first case applying Audi (CA), supra note 1, is Benlen Pte Ltd v Authentic Builder Pte Ltd [2018] SGHC 
61. In that case, the contract stipulated that payment claims were to be served on the 25th of each month; as 
25 June 2017 was a public holiday, the claimant had served the payment claim on 23 June 2017. The High 
Court held that there was a “good reason” to effect service on the 23rd (at para 37), but that the respondent 
would “reasonably be confused about the operative date” as the payment claim had been dated 23 June 2017 
(at para 38). 
73 Building and Construction Authority, Public Feedback Sought on Proposed Amendments to the Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (SOPA), Annex A, S/No 11, online: Building and Construction 
Authority <https://www.bca.gov.sg/SecurityPayment/review.html>  [emphasis in original]. 
